In the first sections we extend and generalize Gröbner basis theory to submodules of free right modules over monoid rings. Over free monoids, we adapt the known theory for right ideals and prove versions of Macaulay's basis theorem, the Buchberger criterion, and the Buchberger algorithm. Over monoids presented by a finitely generated convergent string rewriting system we generalize Madlener's Gröbner basis theory based on prefix reduction from right ideals to right modules. After showing how these Gröbner basis theories relate to classical group-theoretic problems, we use them as a basis for a new class of cryptosystems that are generalizations of the cryptosystems described in Barkee et al. (J Symb Comput 18, 497-501, 1994) and Fellows and Koblitz (Contemp Math 168, 51-61, 1994). Well known cryptosystems such as RSA, El-Gamal, Polly Cracker, Polly Two and a braid group cryptosystem are shown to be special cases. We also discuss issues related to the security of these Gröbner basis cryptosystems.
Introduction
In recent years, algebraic cryptosystems experienced a considerable increase in active interest, mainly due to the braid group based cryptosystem suggested in [1] . In this paper we want to unite recent attempts at group based cryptosystems with earlier suggestions by Neal Koblitz and others in a commutative setting (see [8] and section 5.3 of [15] ). Unfortunately, these earlier suggestions met a very polemic response by the Gröbner basis community (see the paper by Boo Barkee et al. [2] ; note that Boo was the name of Moss Sweedler's former dog). In the following years, there were only scattered attempts to rescue these Polly Cracker type cryptosystems, for instance in [18, 19] . We find it particularly ironic that one of the authors of that polemic paper [2] , Teo Mora aka. Theo Moriarty, had already helped to develop the very Gröbner basis theory for non-commutative rings which we feel is destined to overcome those initial objections (see [25] [26] [27] ).
Let us explain the basic setup. For non-commutative rings, there are several types of Gröbner basis theories. The natural way of defining Gröbner bases for free associative algebras (i.e. non-commutative polynomial rings) has been generalized to so-called basic algebras by Edward Green and his co-workers (see [6, 10, 11] ). These algebras are characterized by the property that they have a multiplicative vector space basis on which there exists a term ordering. Alas, for the monoid and group rings we are interested in such bases are usually not available. Thus we resort to another generalization of Mora's approach: Klaus Madlener, Birgit Reinert, and their co-workers (see [21] [22] [23] [24] 29] ) have successfully described a Gröbner basis theory for monoid and group rings based on a presentation of the monoid or group by a convergent term rewriting system.
In sections 2, 3, and 4 we extend this theory to the case of submodules of finitely generated right or two-sided free modules over monoid rings. Furthermore, we prove a general version of Macaulay's basis theorem (see Proposition 1) which plays a key role in our cryptosystems, and we formulate generalizations of Buchberger's algorithm for enumerating Gröbner bases (see Theorems 1 and 2). In section 5 we show how one can solve well-known problems (such as the word problem, the subgroup problem, the conjugacy problem, and the conjugator search problem) if one succeeds in computing a Gröbner basis of the appropriate module.
Then we introduce a new class of Gröbner basis cryptosystems in section 6. We show that this class contains the original Polly Cracker cryptosystems (see [8] and section 5.3 of [15] ), Ly's Polly Two system (see [19, 20] ), the RSA cryptosystem (see [30] ), the ElGamal cryptosystem (see [5] ), and certain group based cryptosystems derived from [14] . Other special cases are the non-commutative polynomial cryptosystems of [28] . The underlying idea of our cryptosystems is straightforward: the plain text units are normal forms of elements w.r.t. a finitely generated module, encryption is achieved by adding a random element of the module, and decryption uses a Gröbner basis of the module and a reduction process to compute the normal form again. The security of such cryptosystems is based on a number of facts:
• Gröbner bases are usually difficult to compute.
• The attacker knows only part of the module for which he wants to compute a Gröbner basis; the Gröbner basis of this part may be infinite.
• The action of the monoid ring on the module can encode hard combinatorial and number theoretic problems.
• The structure of the base ring may encode hard algebraic and combinatorial problems.
In section 7 we consider the efficiency of the computations that are involved when using the cryptosystem. Moreover we discuss how one can meet various attacks on the system. A more general discussion about these and related issues follows in the last section, together with some suggestions for generating further secure instances of Gröbner basis cryptosystems.
Gröbner bases for right modules over free monoid rings
In the following we let = {x 1 , . . . , x n } be a finite alphabet. The monoid of words (or terms) generated by will be denoted by * . Its elements are of the form w = x i 1 · · · x i s with i 1 , . . . , i s ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Its neutral element is the empty word λ, and its multiplication is given by concatenation.
Let K be a field. The free monoid ring (or the free associative algebra or the non-commutative polynomial ring) of * over K is the set consisting of all formal sums s i=1 c i w i with c i ∈ K and w i ∈ * together with the obvious addition and the multiplication defined by extending the multiplication in * linearly.
Our goal in this section is to develop some parts of a Gröbner basis theory for submodules of finitely generated free right modules over the free monoid ring K [ * ]. We shall content ourselves with introducing those results that are necessary to define and study the cryptosystems in section 6. We begin by recalling the basics of the Gröbner basis theory for two-sided and right ideals of K [ * ] described in [22] [23] [24] 29] .
Let σ be a term ordering on * , i.e. a total ordering such that: 1. The inequality w 1 ≤ σ w 2 implies w 3 w 1 w 4 ≤ σ w 3 w 2 w 4 for all elements w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ∈ * . 2. Every descending chain of terms w 1 ≥ σ w 2 ≥ σ · · · in * is eventually stationary, i.e. σ is a well-ordering. Then every f ∈ K [ * ] \ {0} has a unique representation f = s i=1 c i w i with c i ∈ K \ {0} and w i ∈ * such that w 1 > σ w 2 
Given a two-sided ideal I ⊆ K [ * ], the leading term ideal of I is defined to be the two-sided ideal generated by the leading terms of the non-zero elements of I and is denoted by LT *
, the right leading term ideal of I is defined to be the right ideal generated by the leading terms of the non-zero elements of I and is denoted by LT σ (I ) = LT σ ( f ) | f ∈ I \ {0} . (The subscript will be used to denote right modules, right generation, etc.) A set of elements
. Now we extend this theory to submodules of free right modules over the ring K [ * ]. Let be a finite or countably infinite set, and let F be the free right K [ * ]-module with basis {e i | i ∈ }. The elements of F can be represented as formal sums i∈ e i f i where all but finitely many of the elements f i ∈ K [ * ] are zero. Furthermore, let U ⊆ F be a finitely generated right submodule. In this situation we introduce Gröbner bases as follows. 
Finally, a set of non-zero vectors
The following result will become essential for our cryptosystems.
Proposition 2.2 (Macaulay's Basis Theorem) Let τ be a module term ordering on T(F ) and U ⊆ F a right submodule. Then the residue classes of the terms in
Since τ is a well ordering we may assume that m has minimal leading term with respect to τ among all elements of F whose residue classes are not contained in A. If LT τ (m) ∈ T(F ) \ LT τ {U } then m − LM τ (m) also has residue class not in A, but has a smaller leading term, a contradiction. If LT τ (m) ∈ LT τ {U } then there exists u ∈ U with LT τ (u) = LT τ (m). But then m − LC τ (m)/LC τ (u)u has residue class not in A but has a smaller leading term than m, giving again a contradiction. Therefore the residue classes of
A Gröbner basis of U allows us to compute for each residue class in F /U a representative that is a K -linear combination of elements of T(F ) \ LT τ {U }. Gröbner bases can be characterized via the corresponding reduction systems. Proof From the fact that τ is a module term ordering it immediately follows that the term rewriting system Macaulay's Basis Theorem yields the equality of vector spaces 
Proof If G is a τ -Gröbner basis then by Proposition 2.4
We want to show that 
exists independently on any conditions on
Let c 1 and c 2 be the coefficient of LT τ (g i 1 w i 1 ) in m 1 and m 2 , respectively, where at most one of c 1 and c 2 is zero. With a slight abuse of notation in the case that one of the coefficients is zero we have c i 1 
Easy examples show that not every right submodule of F has a finite Gröb-ner basis, even if both F and the submodule are finitely generated. However, the following generalization of Buchberger's algorithm (and of the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure) provides us at least with a procedure for enumerating a Gröbner basis. We say that a selection strategy for elements from a set B is fair if no element stays in B forever, i.e. if it is not possible that the addition of new elements to B delays the selection forever. 
This is a procedure that enumerates a τ -Gröbner basis G of U . If U has a finite τ -Gröbner basis, it stops after finitely many steps and the resulting tuple G is a finite τ -Gröbner basis of U.
Proof For every pair g, g in the output G we have S(g, g ) G −→ 0 by construction of G if the S-vector of g, g exists. By Proposition 2.6 the set G is a Gröbner basis.
If there exists a finite Gröbner basis G = {g 1 , . . . , g k } then, since the procedure enumerates a Gröbner basis G,
Thus no element is appended to G anymore and the procedure halts after treating all (i, j) ∈ B.
Gröbner bases for two-sided modules over free monoid rings
In this section we give a brief account of a Gröbner basis theory for submodules of two-sided free modules over free monoid rings, since this theory will be applied in section 5 to the conjugator search problem.
Let F be a two-sided free module over K [ * ] with basis {e i | i ∈ } where is finite or countably infinite. By this we mean the K [ * ]-bimodule consisting of elements of the form i∈ j∈N f i j e i g i j where all but finitely many of the elements f i j , g i j ∈ K [ * ] are zero and where we identify c f e i g and f e i cg for
. Furthermore, let U ⊆ F be a two-sided submodule. In this setting, Definition 2.1 can be adjusted as follows. 
The set of all terms in F will be denoted by T(F).
A module term ordering on T(F) is a total ordering τ such that:
1. 
Finally, a set of vectors
Since we are not going to use them, we leave it to the reader to write down the two-sided versions of Propositions 2.2 and 2.4. However, we want to explain the computation of two-sided Gröbner bases. The definition of S-vectors and critical pairs now reads as follows.
respectively, is called the S-vector of f and g.
Using this definition, both the Buchberger Criterion 2.6 and the Buchberger Algorithm 2.7 hold true without modifications and with the same proofs. Thus there is also a procedure for enumerating a two-sided Gröbner basis of a two-sided submodule of the two-sided free module F.
Gröbner bases for modules over monoid rings
In this section we consider a finitely presented monoid M = * / ∼ W where ∼ W is the equivalence relation on * generated by a finite number of relations w 1 ∼ w 1 , . . . , w r ∼ w r . We shall use a multiplicative notation for M. Let K be a field. The monoid ring of M over K is the K -algebra
with K -basis M and multiplication induced by extending the multiplication of M linearly. Assumptions From now on we shall always assume that there exists a term ordering σ on * such that w i > σ w i for i = 1, . . . , r , i.e. for the relations defining M, implying that the string rewriting system The remainder of this section is devoted to introducing and studying Gröbner bases for submodules of right free modules over K [M] . In the following we collect the necessary results generalizing the theory of prefix rewriting and prefix Gröbner bases for one-sided ideals of K [M] developed in [22] [23] [24] 29] . A Gröbner basis theory for the two-sided case can be introduced in a similar way. However, we do not need it here so we omit it.
Assumptions Let be a finite or countably infinite set, and let F be the free right K [M]-module with basis {ē i | i ∈ }. The elements of F are of the form i∈ ē i f i where only finitely many of the elements f i ∈ K [M] are non-zero. Furthermore, let U ⊆ F be a finitely generated right submodule, and let τ be a module term ordering on T(F ) that is compatible with the term ordering σ on * , i.e. for all i ∈ and w 1 , w 2 ∈ * with w 1 < σ w 2 we have e i w 1 < τ e i w 2 . Using the above assumption, we can view τ as an ordering on the set of terms Unfortunately, in general one cannot decide whether an equation sx = t is solvable for x in the monoid M. Therefore one cannot decide whether a vector w ∈ F can be strongly reduced by another one. To make this decision feasible, we introduce a weaker kind of reduction. In the situation of this definition we have LT τ (vm 2 ) = LT τ (v) m 2 . Therefore the term rewriting system generated by prefix reduction steps is Noetherian. By using prefix reduction instead of strong reduction we gain computability, but another problem arises. We have to pay the price that given a set of generators G of U and a vector v ∈ U we do not necessarily have v G ←→ π 0. This additional property can be achieved by prefix saturation. There are examples for vectors v ∈ F for which there does not exist a finite prefix saturated set S such that v = S . However, the following procedure enumerates such a set. −→ π , a contradiction again.
In analogy to Proposition 2.4 we now introduce Gröbner bases for prefix rewriting. Macaulay's Basis Theorem also holds: If U is a right submodule of F then the residue classes of the terms in T(F ) \ LT τ (U ) form a K -basis of F /U . In order to characterize prefix Gröbner bases by a Buchberger criterion, we need to define the proper notion of S-vectors. Finally, we provide a procedure for computing prefix Gröbner bases. 
Definition 4.8 Let U be a right submodule of F . A set G ⊆ U is called a prefix

Definition 4.10 Let v, w ∈ F . If there exists an element m ∈ M such that
LT τ (v) m ≡ LT τ (w) or LT τ (v) ≡ LT τ (w) m then the element S(v, w) = LC τ (v) −1 vm − LC τ (w) −1 w or S(v, w) = LC τ (v) −1 v − LC τ (w) −1 wm,
respectively, is called the S-vector of v and w.
Proposition 4.11 (Buchberger Criterion for Prefix Gröbner Bases) Let G ⊆ F be a prefix saturated set. Then the set G is a prefix τ -Gröbner basis for G if and only if we have S(v, w)
Let H = G, A = G, S h = {h} for all h ∈ G, s = s and B
= {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ s , g i , g j
have a non-trivial S-vector}. 2. If A is empty, return H and stop. Otherwise start a computation of Sat(h) using Proposition 4.7 for every h ∈ A. If this procedure yields Sat(h) = S h , remove h from A. Otherwise, stop the procedure when it has computed a finite subset S h of Sat(h) consisting of S h and at least one more element. Append the elements of h∈A (S h \ S h ) to H , increase s by the number s of these new elements, and write H
= {h 1 , . . . , h s }. Set S h = S h and append {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ s , j > s − s , h i , h j have a
non-trivial S-vector} to the set B. 3. If B = ∅, continue with step 2. Otherwise, use a fair strategy to choose a pair (i, j) ∈ B and delete it from B.
Using H −→ π , reduce S(h i , h j ) as much as possible and call the result S (h i , h j ). If S (h i , h j ) = 0, continue with step 2. Otherwise, increase s by one, set h s = S (h i , h j ) and append h s to H and A. Set S h s
= {h s }, append {(i, s ) | 1 ≤ i < s , h i , h
This is a procedure that enumerates a prefix τ -Gröbner basis H of U . Proof The set H enumerated by the procedure is prefix saturated as it is the union of prefix saturated sets Sat(h). By construction we have S(h i
The assertion now follows from Propositions 4.6 and 4.11.
Some classical problems
As above, we let M = * / ∼ W be a finitely presented monoid, we let be a finite or countably infinite set, and we let F be the free right K [M]-module with basis {ē i | i ∈ }. We continue to operate under the general assumptions introduced above. Moreover, we suppose that a right submodule U ⊆ F is given by a finite tuple of generators U = (ū 1 , . . . ,ū s ) and that we know a prefix Gröbner basis of U .
In this setting a number of classical problems for groups and monoids can be solved using Gröbner basis techniques. Therefore the original computational problem becomes the problem to find the correct Gröbner basis. Let us illustrate the method with some examples. The generalized word problem (also called the submonoid membership problem) was discussed in [22] . It was shown that it leads to a subalgebra membership problem in K [M] . For groups the situation is somewhat more accessible, since the subgroup membership problem is equivalent to a right ideal membership problem
The next interesting monoid and group theoretic problems are the conjugacy problem and the conjugator search problem. Let us indicate some methods for solving them using Gröbner bases. 
. , f s ).
In the case M = * , there exist explicit descriptions of algorithms to compute syzygy modules (see [7] and [10] ). For the general case, we can either lift the computation to K [ * ] or construct a similar algorithm (see [3] ). The computation of syzygy modules and the following easy proposition help us achieve our goal.
Proposition 5.4
Let M be a group. Forw 1 ,w 2 ∈ M, the following conditions are equivalent:
Proof It suffices to note that we havew 1 =w 3w2w −1 3 if and only ifw 1w3 =w 3w2 , i.e. if and only if e 1w3 −w 3 e 2 is a syzygy of (w 1 ,w 2 ).
Hence the conjugacy and the conjugator search problems have been reduced to finding certain very simple elements in a syzygy module. The latter task can be achieved by a straightforward generalization of the method in the commutative case (see section 3.1 of [16] and section 4.3 of [17] ).
Gröbner basis cryptosystems
In this section we will propose a public key cryptographic primitive based on the Gröbner basis theory in the setting described so far. Note that to actually use this Gröbner basis cryptosystem one has to find instances that guarantee efficient computations where needed and security under certain assumptions. We show how one can realize well known public key cryptosystems as special cases of this cryptographic framework. Besides these examples we do not give concrete instances, however, we will discuss how one can meet various attacks on the system in the next section.
In the following we continue to work in the described setting and use the assumptions of the earlier sections. In particular, we let M = * / ∼ W be a finitely presented monoid and assume that elements of M can be represented by normal forms that can be efficiently computed, e.g. by a convergent term rewriting sys- Note that the right choice of f 1 , . . . , f s ∈ K [M] in the encryption procedure can be crucial for the security of the cryptosystem and will depend on the concrete setting in which the primitive is used. For some settings this issue will be discussed in the next section. In this way we achieve some additional data hiding: the summand m f 0 on the right hand-side has the same shape as the other summands. However there is no general method for performing the "division" NF τ,Ū (m f 0 ) → m. We have to provide an explicit procedure in every individual example.
Let us collect some easy remarks about the merits of such a cryptosystem. (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) ∈ K n , or equivalently, the Gröbner basis
Encryption procedure:
We proceed in a similar way to the variant above.
A plaintext is an element m ∈ K . We choose random polynomials h ∈ ( f 1 , . . . , f s ) and h ∈ ker(φ) and a random exponent κ ∈ N n . Then we send (y κ , my κ + h + h ) where y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) . In other words, an attacker knows the pair (φ(y) κ , mφ(y) κ + φ(h)).
This is Le Van Ly's Polly Two cryptosystem (cf. [19] ). Compared to Polly Cracker, it has the advantage that the usual linear algebra attacks do not work. It appears that an attacker has no choice but to compute a (possibly hard) Gröbner basis. Supposedly hard concrete instances of this cryptosystem have been suggested (see [12] ).
is a commutative polynomial ring in two indeterminates. Moreover, let p, q 0 be two distinct prime numbers, let n = pq, and let = (Z/nZ) × be the set of residue classes prime to n. We use the free module F = It is easy to see that this is the Gröbner basis version of the RSA cryptographic primitive (see [30] ) which is used to derive concrete instances of practical cryptosystems that are widely used in practice. If an attacker is able to factor n, he can break the code. This is equivalent to being able to find d. In the Gröbner basis version, the problem the attacker faces is that he does not know the Gröbner basis elements e i y − e i d mod n .
Also discrete logarithms can be used in Gröbner basis cryptosystems.
is a polynomial ring. Moreover, let p 0 be a prime number. We use the Clearly, this is the Gröbner basis version of the ElGamal cryptosystem (see [5] ). It can be broken if the attacker is able to compute the discrete logarithm a of b = g a or k of g k . In the Gröbner basis version, an attacker can only reduce using
−→ x k e 1 which takes k 0 reduction steps. If one knows a, one can get rid of the vector g k by using just one reduction step g k −→ e g ka = e b k .
The next example uses non-commutative polynomials. In order to prevent linear algebra attacks (see next section) Rai suggested in his recent doctoral thesis [28] to construct Gröbner basis cryptosystems based on two-sided ideals. The corresponding Gröbner basis theory was sketched in [22] [23] [24] 29] and section 3. In [28] several concrete instances of these cryptosystems are proposed. They offer good resistence to linear algebra attacks because using indeterminate coefficients for the polynomials f i and g j leads to systems of quadratic equations in these coefficients which cannot be solved using linear algebra. However, one has to take great care to make these cryptosystems secure against attackers who are able to compute partial Gröbner bases (see Chapter 4 of [28] ).
Our approach is flexible enough to include recent attempts at group based cryptosystems. For instance, the following Gröbner basis cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of solving the conjugator search problem in certain groups.
Example 6.9 Let K be a field, and let M = * / ∼ W be a finitely presented group. We use the free right
(possibly of infinite rank). Moreover, let τ = llexPos be such that w > τ eū for all w, u ∈ M. Choose a, g ∈ M and compute g = a −1 ga. Now consider the following Gröbner basis cryptosystem:
1. Public information: The module F , the elements g, g ∈ M, a set B ⊆ {c ∈ M | ca = ac}, the set O τ (U ) = {ew |w ∈ M}, and the vectors first, where
As one can readily check, this is a Gröbner basis version of an ElGamal like cryptosystem based on a group with a "hard" Diffie-Hellman conjugacy problem, i.e. the problem to find a −1 b −1 gba given g, a −1 ga and b −1 gb where a and b commute. One can solve this problem if given g and g = a −1 ga one can find a 1 , a 2 such that a 1 ga 2 = g and a 1 , a 2 commute with the elements from B. The advantage of knowing the Gröbner basis is that one can pass from g to the corresponding e i without going through g −→ e g . The computation of that Gröbner basis is equivalent to finding a.
To perform the encryption step explicitly one has to perform the following sim- So all computations performed to encrypt and decrypt are actually computations in the group M.
In [14] braid groups have been suggested for this kind of cryptosystems. However, in [4] it is shown that there is a polynomial time algorithm solving the DiffieHellman conjugacy problem in braid groups. If one chooses reasonable parameters this algorithm is not feasible today but it seems that a braid group based version of this cryptosystem is not secure in the future.
Efficiency and security considerations
Although we are not going to propose concrete examples of Gröbner basis cryptosystems, we are now going to discuss some issues one has to confront if one tries to construct hard instances.
Efficiency
Both for encryption and decryption, the users of Gröbner basis cryptosystems have to be able to compute efficiently in the ring K [M] where K is a computable field and M a finitely presented monoid. The complexity of the multiplication in M is controlled by the convergent term rewriting system W −→. However, for efficient computations in F we also have to make sure that the supports of the elements we use do not get too large.
In particular, this constraint has to be taken into account when one has to compute the normal form NF τ,G in the decryption procedure. To make the necessary reduction steps feasible, we have to choose the Gröbner basis G suitably. 
Linear algebra attacks
Several types of linear algebra attacks have been proposed that apply to special Gröbner basis cryptosystems. 1. The basic type is the attack proposed in the original paper [8] . In the equation w = m +ū 1 f 1 + · · · +ū s f s , the attacker regards the coefficients of f 1 , . . . , f s as unknowns and tries to solve the resulting linear system of equations. In our setup, it is possible to make this attack infeasible: By choosing a large set O τ (U ), we can make the plaintext m "similar" to the ciphertext w. By using a module of large rank, we can make the solution of this linear system infeasible. Moreover, since we are working over a monoid or group ring, many products (e i t)t with e i t ∈ Supp(ū j ) and t ∈ Supp( f j ) can be made to yield the same term, so that the corresponding coefficients cannot be recovered. 2. The "intelligent" linear algebra attack suggested by Lenstra and described in section 5.6 of [15] , is based on the idea that in the equation w = m+ū 1 f 1 +· · ·+ū s f s one can guess the terms t occuring in the support ofū 1 , . . . ,ū s if t · Supp( f i ) intersects Supp(w), and that the list of all such terms is not too large. As before, in our approach this attack can be repelled in several ways, namely by working over group rings or by using a free module of large rank. In each case sufficient cancellation happens during the computation of the cyphertext.
The differential attack
In [12, 13] Hofheinz and Steinwandt described a "differential" attack on the Polly Cracker cryptosystem. This attack uses the observation that in an expansion w = m+ u 1 f 1 + · · · +ū s f s the quotients of terms in the support of w sometimes allow conclusions about the shape of the supports of the elementsū 1 , . . . ,ū s . In our setting, this attack can be repelled in the very same way as the "intelligent" linear algebra attack described above.
The attack using characteristic terms
If a representation w = m +ū 1 f 1 + · · · +ū 2 f 2 is such that there are terms in w that do not belong to O τ (U ) and therefore not to Supp(m) then it is sometimes possible to reveal individual messages by performing suitable linear algebra on the coefficients of w and f 1 , . . . , f s , in particular when there exist "characteristic terms", i.e. terms that occur in just one of the elements f i . By recognizing multiples of these terms in the ciphertext one can reconstruct a constant message unit. As before this attack rests on the fact that plaintext units are small, i.e. that O τ (U ) is small. Furthermore, if several products t · t with t ∈ Supp(ū i ) and t ∈ Supp( f i ) contribute to one coefficient of w this attack becomes infeasible. Thus the defensive measures described above apply.
Chosen ciphertext attacks
In the proposed cryptosystems the receiver has no method for detecting invalid ciphertexts. In addition, since decryption is K -linear, the chosen ciphertext attacks described in [9] and p. 110 of [14] are possible. However, by using suitable hash functions the system can be made secure in the way described in [20] : the sender appends a suitable random value to his message, computes the hash value of the result, and transmits the ciphertext of the message, the ciphertext of the random value, and the hash value.
Discussion and further suggestions
Let us point out some reasons for the choices we made in presenting Gröbner basis cryptosystems and some possibilities for further generalization and improvement.
• In the original Polly Cracker cryptosystem, an attacker has several advantages that allow him to use linear algebra methods. For instance, he knows (or guesses) that the normal form of the ciphertext with respect to an unknown Gröbner basis is very simple. Since no cancellation occurs when one multiplies terms in a polynomial ring, this means that many coefficients have to vanish. Using a similar system over the monoid ring of a large monoid with a sufficient amount of cancellation foils this attack. This is the reason why we think it is advisable to use monoid rings as base rings.
• The fact that Gröbner basis theory works for modules and not just rings gives us another degree of freedom: we can encode the action of a monoid on a set (namely the set of basis vectors of a free module). Hard instances of such actions are known.
• By leaving the world of commutative rings, we gain another advantage. In most cases, submodules of free modules over non-commutative rings do not have a finite Gröbner basis, and even the computation of partial ("truncated") Gröbner bases may not be practical. Therefore it is not difficult to create sets of vectors {u 1 , u 2 , . . . } such that the module u 1 , u 2 , . . . has no "reasonable" Gröbner basis whereas a larger module (that is kept secret) does.
• An alternative, large class of non-commutative algebras for which there exists a well-developed Gröbner basis theory is the class of path algebras (see e.g. [10, 11] ). Using these algebras as base rings, we can introduce a new kind of complexity: the oriented graph underlying a path algebra can incorporate hard combinatorial problems. We believe that this aspect deserves to be examined further in the future.
• Altogether, we can conclude that Gröbner basis cryptosystems allow us to combine several difficult computational problems coming from separate areas of mathematics. We think they form a suitable framework for searching for new hard instances.
